Portfolio effects of debt-equity swaps and debt exchanges with some applications to Latin America by Oks, Daniel
Policy,  Research,  and External  Affairs  '  t
WORKING PAPERS






of Debt-Equity  Swaps
and Debt Exchanges
with Some  Applications
to Latin America
Daniel Oks
This  model  expk;lans  %%hV  dcbt-ejUitv  sx;aps  tcendi  to  raise  the
steady-state  price  of  sovereign  debt  in Chile  anid Brazil  and
redUce it in Aroenti na and  exico.
.. C  i'F..<X,  t'S''  "C  C  '.  1''  s'  ''4  ,.(,''  . '  '  . I  ..  '  >"  1  'l%''>  ."  '  d  <  '.,'.  . ..'::.  :r'C  :t  VLt  !..g  1  i  "'::  I'-scSv  V :  -r  ,  :~  k  C.........  <,  e  l6Jv  a,  K IX A  < ,  d  ........................ c  i  dx  ~i~  Phe  - ................  ,<n,,
rh  u.  fen  ~f  ^  sa*U  .,,  ;  s..............................  .<  I<  ,1k:d.*!R,F->  .......................  uv,5s  .I
















































































































dPolicv, Research, and Exler..:al  Affairs
Debt and International Finance
WPS 450
This paper --  a product of  the  Debt andl International Fiianice Division, International Economics
Department - is part of a larger effort in PRE to assess the macroeconomic effects of voluntary debt
reduction.  Copies are available free from ttle World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.
Please contact Sheila King-Watson, room SS-025, extension 31(47 (37 pages with tables).
Oks proposes a portfolio equilibrium model for  the following parameters~  the foreign resource
assessing the short-temi and long-term  transfer a country can make, the ratio of domestic
macroeconomic  effects  of debt buybacks  antd  equity  held  by foreigners  to a country's  foreign
debt equity-swaps.  debt, the terms of the debt-equity exchange, the
rate of profit or equity, the rate of profit remit-
Hie  examines the main results in the lighlt  of  tances, and the technology (decreasing, constant,
recent Latin American experien1ce  with voluntary  or increasing retums to scale).
debt reduction. He shows ttiat in the short-tcrm,
dcbt-cquity swaps are inflationar-y  and raise real  Estimates of these parameters indicate that
equity and sovereigin  debt prices -and  that  debt-equity swaps raise the steady-state price of
loreigin  dcbt huybacks at a discouunt  raise real  soverciLn dcht in Chile and Brazil and reduce it
equity alld sovercign debt prices.  in Mexico.
'T'hie stead\-state  illmlactl  of' dcht-equit\  S'x ap
oni  sovereign  dfebt  prices  hinoes  oni the  \tvalues  ot
Thle IR t. Working  Paper  Serie'  (dIsCn  I inmres  thie  tilnr  ding  f A ork un(ieTr \ax  in Lhe BanK s Pol I  . Research  an  d Exter  nal
Atl;air'. (ompliex  Anl  ohne. ti'.  of  thle series  is to get  lh '.e  findings  out quickl\  c.een  if presentations  are less than] full'.
;0il'Ihedk.  Ihe  1ndin lRlg.,  Inter'pret.itIOns.,  anld cnOluT'.iOn1I  In  the'.e  pap..'rs (d  o  not  necc's.aril\  represent  official  aBank  pIitc 
PrOl  .u.  AU  l'R  FI:  D  'mr:i::  ( *CrTt:rCONTENTS
1.  Introduction.
2.  An End-of-Period  Short-Term  Portfolio  Model
3.  Short-Term  Impact  of  Voluntary  Debt  Reduction.
4.  Recent  Experience  i  Latin  America.
5.  A Dynamic Model for Assessing Debt Equity Swap Programs.
6.  Some  Applications  to  Latin  America.
7.  Conclusions.
References
I thank  Bella  Balassa,  Stijn  Claessens  and Jonathan  Eaton  for  useful
comments  on  a previous  draft  of this  paper.1.  INTRODUCTION
Voiuntary debt reduction  schemes (VDR), such as debt-equity  swaps
(DES)  or Lollateralized  debt  conversions'  (CDC),  are  bound  to play  a relevant
role in the foreign  debt strategy  of highly  indebted  countries  (HICs). Deep
discounts  on the  price  of sovereign  debt in secondary  markets  constitute  the
single  most important  incentive  for  debtors  and  foreign  investors  to engage  in
VDR.  Some  of the  factors  behind  these  discounts  are: high  international  real
interest rates, which make  debt service more burdensome  and eventually
unfeasible;  the reduced  creditworthiness  of sovereign  borrowers,  following  a
deterioration  in  domestic  fiscal  situations;  and the  overall  poor performance
of HICs under  conventional  schemes  of exterzt.L  financing  with the consequent
realization  that debt problems  are not just a consequence  of a  liquidity
crisis. The recent  surge  in VDR  activity  is also  linked  to  the  rtrengthening
of commercial  banks' balance sheets, and the recent  commitment  of public
monies from creditor  governments  and multilateral  agencies  to finance  debt
exchanges  at a discount,  i.e.,  the  Brady  Initiative.
Debtor  countries  may benefit  from VDR due to several  factors:  cash-
flow  relief;  wealth  effects;  incentive  effects;  a reduction  of uncertainty  and
country  risk  premia;  and  an improvement  in public  finances. Cash-flow  relief
stems  from  principal  and  interest  reduction  and, if  foreign  debt  is public,  it
1.  A collaterized  debt  conversion  is  an exchange  of old  debt for  new
collateralized  or guaranteed  debt  at a discount. The  discount  increases  with
the  degree  of  collaterization,  but  may  also  depend  on other  attributes  of the
new  debt,  e.6.  the  new  debt  may  be treated  as senior  debt  and  hence  be
exchanged  at better  terms  with  the  old  debt.2
contributes  to improve  public  finances. Since  debt is  substracted  from  assets
to calculate wealth, VDR  may  raise perceived  wealth and, hence, reduce
saving.2 VDR  may  reduce  uncertainty  about  future  economic  policy  if  it lowers
significantly  the debt service  by reducing  the likelihood  of default (the
benefits  of default  drop relative  to the  cost of default). A lower  foreign
public  debt service  may  also lower  expectations  of future  taxation  and,hence,
constitute  an incentive  for investment. Finally,  if VDR have a more than
transitory  beneficial  effect  on the price of debt in secondary  markets,  an
issue  on which this paper focusses,  the lower  secondary  market  discount  is
likely  to imply  (ceteris  paribus)  lower  risk-adjusted  rates of return;  e.g.
because  restrictions  on profit  remittances  become  less  likely  as the  country's
creditworthiness  improves.
On the other  hand, VDR carry costs in terms  of: foreigr  liquidity;
e.g.,  in the  case of CDC because  reserves  are  allocated  for  collaterization;
inflation,  e.g., in the case of money-financed  DES of private  equity for
public  debt;  higher  debt prices,  which imply  more expensive  VDR;  and the  risk
that the debt repurchase  effort  turns  out to be useless  if creditworthiness
cannot  ultimately  be  regained.
A  rapidly  dpveloping  branch of the literature  has dealt with the
incentive  effects  of debt relief,  e.g.,  Krugman  (1987)  and Sachs  (1986). A
large  public foreign debt  may  create  investment disincentives  because
potential  investors  perceive  that  future  output  would  go,  via  higher  taxes,  to
service the  foreign debt.  In  this context debt relief constitutes  an
incentive  for investment,  since  a lower  debt induces  a country  to invest  more
2.  See  Oks (1990)  for  an analysis  of wealth  effects  of VDR.3
and  adjust,  hence,  raising  the  long-term  ability  of the  country  to service  its
foreign  debt.  On the  other hand,  Corden  (1988)  argued  that excessive  debt
relief  may also have a disincentive  effect  on investment. Beyond  the point
where the country  is no longer  deterred  from investing  due to expected  high
future  taxes,  debt relief  reduces,  rather  than increases,  investmcnt  znd the
associated  trade  surplus. The reason  being  that  debt  relief  raises  perceived
wealth,  and ,hence,  reduces  the saving  rate  of the  country.  Mere recently,
Diwan-Claessens  (1989)  provided a  comprehensive  analysis  of  potential
efficiency  gains from debt reduction assessing whether, and under which
conditions,  can  debt  reduction  be in t%:  interest  of debtors  and/or  creditors.
Other authors have focused their attention  on liquidity effects.
Froot  (1988)  argued  that  liquidity  constraints  are  likely  to  be more  important
than incentive  constraints  in explaining  low levels  of investment  in debtor
countries.  Thus, liquidity  relief  could be more helpful  than debt relief.
Several  more empirically-oriented  studies  look at the cash-flow  dimension  of
VDR,  e.g.,  Lamdany  (1988),  Sanguines  (1989)  and  Larrain  (1989). These  studies
also  provide  good  descriptions  of VDR  programs  in  Bolivia,  Mexico  and  Chile.
The dynamic  impact  of VDR on sovereign  debt prices  has been  analyzed
by Rodriguez  (1989)  and Dooley-Simansky  (1989). On the other  hnad,  Schmidt-
Hebbel  and Morande  (1989)  focused  on the impact  of VDR on equilibrium  levels
of sovereign  debt prices.  In this paper,  we take a similar  approach  as
theirs.  While our approach  is based  on a rather  more simplified  portfolio
equilibrium  context,  we also look  at other  domestic  macroeconomic  effects  of
VDR.4
There  have been relatively  few  attempts  to assess  tle effects  of VDR
on domestic  macroeconomic  variables  that  most concern  policy  makers  in debtor
countries.  One exception is Velasco (1988)  who  in a  utility maximizing
framework  assessed  the impact  of debt swaps  on inflation,  exchange  rates  and
the  current  account.
In a  more conventional  portfolio  framework,  in this paper we also
assess the  impact of  VDR  on  domestic macroeconomic  variables.  More
specifically,  the  objective  of this  paper  is  to evaluate  the  mnpart  of  DES  and
CDC  on inflation,  on equity  prices  and  on sovereign  debt  prices.
For that purpose  we first formulate  a short term portfolio  balance
model  with domestic  and  foreign  assets/liabilities.  A distinctive  feature  of
the model is that all current transactions  take i.lace  at end of period
prices. The model  supports  the view that DES  are inflationary.  aeportedly,
this view has led Latin American  governments  to interrupt  DES programs  in
several  occasions. Recent  empirical  evidence  from  Latin  America  in  fact  shows
some  correlation  between  DES and inflation. The  model  also indicates  that  in
the 3hort  term DES and CDC are likely  to raise  equity  prices  and sovereign
debt  prices. We did  find  some  empirical  support  for  these  results  as well in
the  cases  of Chile  and  Mexico.
Two important  limitations  of the short term  model proposed  are that
asset  stocks  are fixed  and profit  remittances  from  foreign  held  equity  are  not
treated  endogenously.  Thus,  we formulate  a long  term  model  where  asset  stocks
and profit  remittances  are determined  endogenously. We show that  the impact
of DES  on sovereigr  debt prices  depends  on a host of factors:  the expected
trade surplus,  the stocks  of debt and foreign-held  equity, the redemption
price  of  debt,  restrictions  on profit  remittances,  the  physical  rate  of return5
on equity  and the technology  that determines  it.  The technology  was also
found to be crucial for determining  the steady  state impact  of DES on the
stock  and price  of equity. A discussion  regarding  the  dynamics  of  adjustment
to the  steady  state  illustrates  possible  linkages  between  DES  subsidies,  rates
of return  and inveitment  levels.
The paper concludes  with a parametrization  of the conditions  under
which  DES  can  lead to  higher debt prices in  selected Latin American
countries. The evidence  suggests  that in Brazil  and  Chile  DES are bound  to
lead to higher steady state debt  r-ices,  whereas the opposite  occurs in
Argentina  and  Mexico.
In Section  2 we formulate  the  short  term  portfolio  model.  In  Section
3  we derive  the  comparative  static  effects  of DES  and  CDC,  and  in  Section  4  we
examine the model predictions  in the light of the recent  Latin American
experience. In  Sec:tion  5  we present  the  long  term  mode  ind  aasess  the  steady
state  effects  of DES.  In Section  6 we use this  model  to evaluate  empirically
the  potential  impact  on sovereign  debt  prices  of a DES  program. In  Section  7
we summarize  the  conclusions.
2. AN "END  OF PERIOD"  SHORT-TERM  PORTFOLIO  MODEL
In  order  to  assess  the  short-term  financial  impact  of VDR  we formulate
a short-term  "end of period  equilibrium"  portfolio  model  with perfect  myopic
foresight.
The  model  assumes  perfect  myopic  foresight  and  is  of the  end  of  period
equilibrium  type, in the sense that equilibrium  requires  that all markets
clear  when all assets/liabilities  are valued  at correctly  anticipated  end of
period  prices. For  example,  demand  for  money  matches  the  stock  of real  money6
obtained  deflating  the  nominal  stock  of  money  with  the  end  of period  inflation
price index.  Similarly,  equity and sovereign  debt stocks are valued at
correctly  anticipated  end cf period  prices.  Consiscency  requires  that real
wealth  should  also  be  measured  at end  of period  prices. One  crucial  advantage
of the end of period  formulation  is that changes  in the rates  of return  of
assets  stemming  from  asset  revaluations  do not  generate  an explosively  growing
excess demand for these assets (precisely  due to the revaluation  of the
stock).
Private residents demand three domestic assets: base money (m),
interest-bearing  public  debt (b)  and equity  (s).  Asset  stocks  m, b  and  s  are
expressed  in real terms and the corresponding  asset demand functions  are
linear  in real  domestic  wealth  (w).  The  nominal  rate  of return  on  bonds  (ib)
is fixed  but perfect  myopic  foresight  of inflation  (C)  implies  that  the ex-
ante real return  on bonds (rb) and the real return  on base money (-ir)  are
endogenously  determined.
(1)  rb  =  ib  - X
Given  the  short  term  nature  of this  model  we assume  that  dividends  of
foreign-held  equity, direct foreign investment,  foreign  transfers  and the
trade  surplus  are  constant  in the  period. We assume  that  all  foreign  debt is
public  debt.  Note that constant  dividends  on foreign  equity can also be
justified because typically there are  short term restrictions  on profit
remittances  for  DES-financed  investments,  i.e.,  profits  on new foreign  equity
cannot  be remitted  in the short  run.  This assumptio  ,  though,  is removed  in
the long-term  model  of Section  5.  For simplicity  of the terms  employed,  we
shall refer to  the constant difference  between the non-interest  current7
account  (trade  sur-ylus  plus transfers  less dividend  remittances)  and direct
foreign  investment  as the  "trade  surplus"  t.
The real return  on equity  (r 5) is  equal  to the  sum  of: i) the short-
term exogenous physical return on capital (rk) times the end of  period
anticipated  real  price  of  equity  (q  + 5qe);  and ii)  the  expected  change  in  the
real  price  of equity  (qe). Perfect  myopic  foresight  implies  that  the  expected
change  in the  real  price  of equity  equals  the  actual  change  in  the  real  price
of equity  (6q),  i.e.,  qe is  consistent  with  next period  q.  Hence,  r 5 can  be
written,
(2)  r_ =rk*(q  +  6q)/q +  6q/q
-rk  +  r*(1  +  rk)
where:  y  =  6q/q
6 is  the  first  time  derivative  of  a variable
The foreign  sector  holds  domest>:  equity  (sf),  sovereign  debt of the
country  (f)  and other  foreign  assets  (oa).  The  market  price  of foreign  debt
is g.  All asset  demands  are linear  in real  foreign  wealth  (wf). The return
on oa (i)  is  exogenous  and  the return  on equity  for  foreigners  is the  same  as
for  residents.
Sovereign  debt is  a perpetuity  with a fixed  contractual  interest  rate
(r)  which  is only  partially  serviced. Hence,  its  rate  of return  (rf)  is the'
sum  of:  i) the  ratio  of the  exogenous  "trade  surplus"  or  external  transfer  and
the outstanding  debt t/f  (the actual debt  service-debt  ratio); ii) the
difference  between  contractual  interest  and  the  actual  debt  service-debt  ratio8
(r - t/f, the  new liability  created  by unpaid  interest);  and iii)  the change
in price  per unit of debt (Cg, the  capital  gain).  A similar  expression  for
the rate of return  on sovereign  debt is employed  by Rodriguez  (1989)  and by
Dooley-Symansky  (1989).
(3)  rf - t/f*g + (r  - t/f)*(g  + dg)/g  + 6g/g
Note that since  the transfer  t goes only to service  sovereign  debt,
debt  reduction  through  DES  raises  the  actual  payment  tOf  as f drops.
Nominal stocks  of money and domrstic  bonds and the real stocks  of
sovereign  debt and equity are fixed,  except, of course, for the changes
induced  by VDR.  Given  the  short  term  context  of our  analysis  this  is  not too
restrictive. Assuming,  for simplicity,  a real exchange  rate of one and a
nominal  exchange  rate perfectly  pegged  to domestic  prices (and  zero foreign
inflation)  the real stocks  of sovereign  debt f and other assets  oa can be
thought  of as  denominated  eithler  in foreign  or in  real  domestic  currency.
Due  to  the  end  of  period  formulation of  the  model  all
assets/liabilities  and wealth are valued at correctly  anticipated  end of
period  prices.  Assuming  initially  the price level,  (p), the real price of
equity  (q)  and of other  foreign  assets  are all equal to one, real domestic
wealth  (w)  and  real  foreign  wealth  (wf)  are:
(4)  w =  (M  + B)/(l  +  i)  +  (s  - sf)*(l  +  y)
where:  M and  B are  the  nominal  stocks  of  money  and  bonds
r  is the  rate  of inflation
y  is  the  rate  of real  equity  price  increase
(5)  wf =  sf*(l  +  y)  + f*g*(l  + A) +  oa
where:  X  =  6g/g9
Asset demands depend on domestic  rates of return in the case of
residents,  and on the rates of return on equity, sovereign  debt and the
(exogenous)  rate  of  return on  other  foreign assets  in  the  case  of
foreigners.  Since  by  Walras  Law  applied  to  domestic  and foreign  wealth  we can
omit the  domestic  bond  and other  foreign  asset  markets  the  independent  market
equilibrium  conditions  are:
(6)  m =  M/(l  +  a)  - md(-.f,rb,rs)*w  mdt  > 0, mdb  <  °,  mdd< O
(7)  s*(l  +  q)  sd(-w,rb,rs)*w  +  sf(rs,rf,i)*Wf
sd  >  0,  sdm  <  sdb  <  0, sf  o, sf  f  < 0  ° 
(8)  f*g*(l  + x)  =  ff(rs,rf,i)*wf  fff  > 0° ff 5 <  0, ffi  <  °
where:  d  superscripts  indicate  resident's  demand  functions
r  superscripts  indicate  foreigner's  demand  functions
subscript  letters  indicate  partial  derivatives  of asset  demand
functions  with  respect  to  the  corresponding  rates  of ret 0 rn
After  substitution  of (4)-(8)  in (9)-(11),  the  system  determines  r,  y
and X for  given  value3  of rk, ib,  r, i,  p, q,  g, t, s, sf,  M, B and  f.
In order to assesis  short-term  effects  of VDR we first sum up the
parameter  change3  (disequilibrium  impact)  induced  by VDR.  'e focus  on DES
where  the foreign  investor  swaps  foreign  public  debt for  private  equity  with
cash being the intermediary  vehicle,  and on CDC whereby the new debt is
exchanged  for the  old debt at a discount  and  both  the  new  and old  debt  carry10
the same interest  rate.  The discount  in the case of CDC stems from free
collatetal  provided  by third  parties  and from seniority  attached  to the  new
debt (seniority  can be imposed  by the providers  of free collateral). For
simplicity,  we assume  that the discount of the  CDC is  equal to the  secondary
market  discount  of old debt.  In this sense,  CDC is equivalenet  to a direct
buyb:ck  with  borrowed  funds.
We assume that both DES and CDC take place  at beginning  of period
prices,  i.e.,  contracts  are  back-dated.  Below  we  analyze  several  implications
of removing  this assumption.  In practice,  beginning  of period  prices  are a
better  approximation  to the ter...  of exchange  of DES than  of CDC  because  of
size.  Since  CDC are usually  larger  in size than DES, the deal tends  to be
implemented  at the prices  which are expected  to prevail  at the end of the
period.
We assume that initially  p and q are equal to one, but by proper
choice of the accounting unit this implies no loss of generality.  We impose
the initial condition that g is smaller than one, i.e., sovereign debt sells
f  and to a reduction in f.  To at a discount.  DES lead to increases in  M and s
encourage DES the authorities introduce a trdnsitory subsidy p  equal to the
difference between the redemption price of debt at the central bank and the
secondary  market price.  If initially p  is zero, the change in o must suffice
to  induce foreign  investors to absorb the  increase in  sf.  The  parameter
changes induced  by DES are thus:
(9)  dM  =  6sf =  - g*6f > 0  (or, 6f  =  -6sf/g)
do  =  6sf/wf*sf  011
where:  sf(.)  becomes  sf(rs,rf,i;o)*wf  during  the  period  of the  swap
Sf  is the  partial  derivative  of sf(.)  with  respect  to p
We assume  that the  new debt issued  for  CDC is fully  serviced  out of
the trade surplus  t.  That is, the new debt carries full seniority,  e.g.,
because it is fully collateralized  by third parties  with that condition.
Thus,  we can consider  the  new debt as part of oa (which  yields  the rate  of
return  i)  and the  external  transfer  t  available  for  servicing  old  debt  becomes
(t - i*8oa).  Since CDC take place at:  beginning  of period prices,  the
parameter  changes  induced  by  CDC  are:
(10)  - 6f/6oa  =  1/g  >  0
6t  =  i*g*6f <  0
If  DES  take place at end of  period prices, then, assuming the
government  repurchases  debt to finance  a preset  level  of equity  investment,
the changes  in the nominal  stock  of money  and in the real stock  of foreign
debt  become  endogenous:
(11)  6sf  >  0  (or  6s  =  6sf  >  0 if  DES  finance  new  investment  projects)
The  levels  of M and  f  are  therefore:
(12)  5M  =  ssf*(l +  y)*(l +  0)
6f =  - 6sf*(l +  y)/g*(l +  *)12
And the  required  subsidy  for  inducing  the  swap  becomes:
(13)  6p - asf*(l+y)/[(l+y)*(sf+ 6sf)  +  (f+6f)*(g+6g)  +  (M+6M+B)/(l+w)]*sf
Note that  the  expression  in  brackets  measures  private  wealth  at end  of
period  prices.
In the case of CDC at end of period terms of exchange,  when the
government  exchanges  a given  amount  of old  debt:
(14)  6f  <  O
The change in the stock of other foreign  assets and the external
transfer  available  for  servicing  old  debt  are  endogenous:
(15)  60)a  =  - 6f*g*(l  +  X)
6t =  i*g*(l  +  X)*6f
One crucial  limitation  of our model is that it ignores  the fiscal
constraint  which best explains the difficulties  of many highly indebted
countries  for  servicing  foreign  public  obligations.  Fiscal  resources  not  only
restrict  the  level  of external  transfer  which  debtors  can  afford  to  make but
also limit  their  ability  to engage  in  DES (since  DES amount  to an anticipated
repurchase  of foreign  public  debt).  One way to at least  partially  overcome
this limitation  is to reinterpret  the  exogenous  trade  surplus  t as the  level
of fiscal resources  which is available to service public sector foreign
obligations. Note that  interpreting  the trade  surplus  as the  fiscal  surplus,
(before foreign debt  service) implies assuming that  private domestic13
investment is  identical to  private domestic savings (From the national
accounts  basic  identity). In this case,  though,  the  exogeneity  or constancy
of t is  even  more  questionable  given  the  cyclical  behavior  of fiscal  revenues.
One way out i5, for example,  to make t endogenous  on the level  of output.
Output  in turn,  could  depend,  via investment,  on the  price  of equity  q.  If  a
DES raises the price of equity, thus, fostering  investment  and output,  by
alleviating  the fiscal  constraint  (raising  t) it would have an additional
beneficial  effect  on the  market  price  of sovereign  debt.
Note that if t  represents  the fiscal transfer,  i.e., implicitly
assuming  that foreign  exchange  is no longer  the binding  constraint  on debt
servicing,  it is perfectly  justifiable  in the case of DES not to substract
profit remittances  from t  since, clearly, profit remittances  are not  a
government  liability. On the  other  hand, in  the case  of CDC subtracting  the
interest  on the new debt is legitimate  since the new debt also has to be
serviced  out  of domestic  fiscal  resources.
Having  formulated  the  model  we now proceed  to examine  its  comparative
static  properties.
3. SHORT-TERM  IMPACT  OF VOLUNTARY  DEBT  REDUCTION.
We assess  the short-term  comparative  static  effects  o' DES and CDC,
implemented  at beginning  of period  prices,  on inflation  and on equity  and
sovereign  debt  prices.14
Totally  differentiating  the  system  (6)-(8)  (after  substitution  of (1)-
(5)  and recalling  (9)):
|  (mdm  +  md  b)*w*(l  +  n)  md*w*(l  +  r)*(l  +  rk)  O|6-wi
l-md(.)*(s - Sf)*(1  + Y)  + md(.)*(1  +  )*(s  - sf)
(16)  (sdm  + sd  b)*w*(l  +  w)  (sd  *w + sfs*wf)*(l  + rk)  f*g*sf(.)  +  I  IY I
i+sd(.)*(M+B)/(1,+.f) 2 +(s-sf)*sd(.)-s+sf*sf(.)  sff*wf*(l+r-t/f)l  I
|  0  ff  *Wf*(l  +  rk)  wf*fff*(l+r-t/f)11IX  I
+ Sf*fd(.)  _ f*g  + ff(.)*f*gl 
1  - md()  I  lmd(.)*(l+wr)*(l+Y)l  I  0  I
I  - (i+y)*sf(.)  |  -g*(14.)*sf(.) |
I  l  I  +  ( 1+y)*sd(.)  I  I_sff*Wf*(tif 2 )*
=  I  j*SM  +  I  4*6Sf  +  I  *(1  +  X - 1/g)  |*6f
I  I  I
0  I  I  - ff(.)*(l+y)  I
I  I  I  I-fff*Wf*(t/f 2)*  I
I  I  lI  I  *(1  +  X - 1/g)  I
I  0  II0  I  lO
I  o  ~  ~I  I  oI  I  o  I
+  I  -sf(.)/(l+w)  1*6oa  +  |-sff*wf*((l/f*g)  - (1/f)*(l+%)]I*6t  +  I-sf  *wfI*60
I  I  f(.)I  I  I  I
I  -ff(.) I  ~  I-fe  f*wf*[(h/f*g)  - (1If)*(+14.)  I  0 15
The sign of the determinant  of (16) is ambiguous. However,  if the
dynamic  counterpart  of the system  (6)-(8)  (e.g.,  dynamic  equations  that  make
-i,  y  and X  a function  of excess  demand  in  the  money,  equity  and  debt  markets)
is locally  stable  the correspondence  principle  implies  that the sign  of the
determinant  is  negative.
Alternatively,  the  following  partial  equilibrium  conditions  imply  that
the matrix  of (16) is a diagonal  matrix  with all elements  of the diagonal
negative  and, hence,  are sufficient  for ensuring  a negative  determinant  and
local  stability  (aii  refers  to the  element  of the i th  row  and  j  th column  of
the  matrix  of (16):
i)  An increase  in  anticipated  inflation  (w)  leads  to  a partial
equilibrium  excess  demand  for money,  since  the stock  of money
valued  at anticipated  end of period  prices  drops faster  than
demand,  i.e.,  all  < 0.
ii)  An increase  in the  anticipated  rate  of increase  of the  price  of
equity  y (debt  X) creates  a partial  equilibrium  excess  supply  of
equity  (debt),  since  the  expected  valuation  of the  equity  (debt)
stock  exceeds  the  increase  in  demand  for  the stock,  i.e.,  a22 <
0 (a 33 <0 ).
iii) The  drop  in  demand  for  an asset  due  to an increase  in the
expected  appreciation  of a substitutable  aseet  is offset,  at a
partial equilibrium level,  by  the  positive wealth effect
stemming  from the asset  appreciation,  i.e.,  a12, a21,  a23 and
a32 all  equal  zero.16
The short-term  comparative  static  multipliers  of DES and CDC under
conditions  i)  to iii)  are  reported  in  !able  1:
Table  1:  Short-Term  Impact  Effects  of DES  and  CDC lt
Changes  in  Endogenous  Variables
1  Y  !
DES  +  + 2/  +
CDC  n  + 3/  + 3/
Notes:  1/  Assuming  that  initially  the  system  is  in  a steady  state  where  n,
y, and  X  are  zero (note  that  X  equal  zero  is  consistent  with  g  <  1).
The  comparative  static  results  are  based  on equations  (12)-(13),
that  is,  VDR implemented  at beginning  of period  prices.
2/  A sufficient  condition  for  this  is that  i be larger  or equal  than  r
or alternatively  that  sf is initially  small. To obtain  this  compa-
rative  static  result  note  that  condition  iii)  implies  that:
-sff*Wf/sf(.)  =  f*g/(lr-t/f),  and  that  the  steady  state  price  of
debt  is  gs  - (t/f)/(i  - r  +  t/f).
3/  Recalling  that  g9s  =  (t/f)/(i  - r  +  t/f)  and  condition  ii). Note
from  (13)  and  gss that  t/f  falls  with  CDC  since
ft  - i*gs 5 *6fJ/[f  - 6f]  <  t/f.17
The initial  excess supply  of money brought  about by DES leads to
higher  inflation. Although  inflation  is fully  anticipated  and hence demand
for  money  drops,  the contraction  in real  money  balances  is larger  (condition
i)) and, hence, as  inflation increases  the  excess supply of money  is
eliminated.  The  anticipated  increase  in the  price  of equity  has  no net  impact
on the money market:  the higher  opportunity  cost of holding  money,  due to
expected  equity  appreciation,  is  compensated  by the  increase  in  wealth  induced
by equity  appreciation  (condition  iii)).
DES induce  a transitory  excess  demand  for  equity  and, hence,  higher
equity prices.  Demand for equity increases  due to the subsidy  o which
outweighs  the negative  impact  on demand  of a higher  actual  debt service-debt
ratio (t/f).  Note that if profit  remittances  from DES-financed  investments
were  allowed,  the  exogenous  component  of the  return  on debt (t/f)  could  drop,
thus,  reinforcing  the  excess  demand  for  equity. The  increase  in  equity  demand
due to its  correctly  anticipated  ap?reciation  falls  short  of the increase  in
value  of the  equity  stock  (condition  ii)).  Thus,  when equity  prices  increase
the  excess  demand  for  equity  is  eliminated.  As before,  the  negative  impact  of
the anticipated  appreciation  of sovereign  debt  on equity  demand  is  offset  by
higher  foreign  wealth  due  to  debt  revaluation  (condition  iii)).
DES also create  a transitory  excess  demand  for sovereign  debt which
pushes  upward  its  price.  The initial  excess  demand  for debt is both due to
reduction  in the  debt stock  and to the  increase  in demand  induced  by a  higher
actual  debt service-debt  ratio (t/f).  Note, though,  that in the  absence  of
restrictions  on profit  remittances  t/f  could  drop  and,  hence,  push  debt  prices
down.18
With higher real equity and debt prices foreign  wealth increases.
Domestic  private  wealth  may either  increase  or decrease. The outcome  depends
on whether the inflation  erosion  of money and domestic  debt is smaller  or
larger  than  real  equity  appreciation  (since  we employ  a Keynesian-type  wealth
formulation  sovereign debt appreciation  does not  lead to  reductions  in
domestic  wealth). The higher  the elasticity  of money  demand  with  respect  to
anticipated  inflation  and the lower  the elasticity  of demand  of equity  with
respect  to its  own rate of return  the  more likely  that  domestic  wealth  will
drop.
In  the  case of  CDC, domestic and  foreign wealth are  initially
unchanged  since  the voluntary  nature  of the exchange  implies  that exchanged
old debt matches  in value  the increase  in new debt.  The price  of sovereign
debt rises  because  old debt reduction  is larger  than  the drop in demand  for
debt induced  by a lower actual  debt service-debt  ratio.  The latter  ratio
falls since small CDC lower the external  transfer  allocated  to old debt
servicing  proportionately  more than it reduces  old debt (see footnote  3 in
Table  1).
Demand  for equity  and equity  prices  increase  due to the  drop in the
actual  debt service-debt  ratio. The  negative  impact  on equity  demand  of debt
appreciation  is offset by the positive  impact  on demand of higher  foreign
wealth  (condition  ii)).
In short,  CDC raises  the real prices  of sovereign  debt and equity.
The  domestic  price  level  doesn't  change  because  the  increase  in  private  wealth
(and  hence  money  demand)  due to the  higher  real  price  of equity  is offset  by
the drop in money demand induced  by the anticipated  rise in the price of
equity  (condition  iii)).  Since  the domestic  price level  is unchanged,  both19
domestic  and  foreign  wealth  increase  due  to  higher  equity  and  debt  prices.
Note  that  the  secondary  market  price  of debt  rises  more  under  DES  thani
under CDC.  This is a  consequence  of the assumption  that profits  on DES-
financed  foreign equity  are not remitted  abroad,  whereas new debt created
through  CDC is fully  serviced.  This assumption  implies  that the exogenous
component  of the rate  of return  on debt (t/f)  drops  in the  case  of CDC  while
it rises  in the  case  of DES,  hence,  leading  to a higher  excess  demand  for  debt
in the  case  of DES.
4.  Recent  Experience  in  Latin  America.
Argentina,  Brazil, Chile and Mexico were the four Latin American
countries  with more sizable  VDR programs. To assess  the consistency  of the
model  predictions  with empirical  evidence  from these  countries  we inspect  of
series  of inflation,  seconda  market  prices  and stock  market  price indices
(the  proxy  for  equity  prices).
Figure 1 charts  the evolution  of the rate of inflation  and of the
volume  of DES in Argentina,  Brazil  and Mexico  (Chile  is excluded  because  DES
were bond-financed). We exclude informal  DES partly  because  data is less
reliable  and  often  unavailable,  and  partly  because  informal  schemes  consist  of
swaps  of private  (or  public)  firm's  equity  for private  (public)  firm's  debt,
i.e.,  they  are  not the  type  of DES  we considered  in  the  model. The  volume  of
DES  corresponds  to  the  month  of the  auction  and,  when  the  month  of the  auction
is  unknown,  the  annual  level  of DES  was  prorated  on a monthly  basis.20
Figure  1.  Debt-Equity  Swaps  and  inflation  in  Latin  America.
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Note that  during  periods  in  which  DES  were implemented  inflation  was,
on average,  growing.  In Argentina  and Brazil  inflation  rose  in three  out  of
the  four quarters during which DES were implemented  (until 1988).  The
positive  correlation  between  inflation  and  the  DES  volume  is  even  more  obvious
in  the  case  of Mexico. It is  clear,  though,  from  the  sheer  size  of DES  vis-a-
vis  other factors  of the  money supply,  e.g. fiscal  deficits,  that DES along
cannot  account  for inflation. Yet, its impact  on the  margin  could  have been
sizeable,  and what is more important,  easily  managed  by putting  restrictions
on DES  programs,  e.g.,  reportedly  in  Mexico. In some  countries,  such  as Chile
and Brazil, restrictions  on debt-debt  VDR were more directly  targeted  ct
colling off  pressures in  foreign exchange black markets, since foreign
exchange  is  demanded  by firms  to  repurchase  their  debt  at  a discount.
Table 2 reports  secondary  market  prices,  deflated  stock  market  price
indices and actual volumes of offical debt reduction  (DES, CDC and debt
buybacks)  in Chile and Mexico.  These  are the two Latin  American  countries
with longer  official  programs  of  VDR.
Over  the  same  period  in  which  the  Chilean  DES  program  was  in force  the
Chilean  stock  market  price  index  exhibited  an upward  trend. This  is precisely
what the short-term  model predicted. However,  other factors  such  as steady
growth,  structural  reforms  and  economic  and political  stability  have probably
been more important  determinants  of the stock  market  trend.  Although  the
linkage  between  the  DES  program  and the  stock  market  trend  is consistent  with
the  evidence,  the significance,  and even the  direction,  of causality  are far
from  warranted.22
Table  2: Voluntary  Debt  Reduction,  Secondary  Market  Prices  and  Stock
Markets  in  Chile  and  Mexico
(million  US$)
1985  1986  1987  1988
DES  CDC  BB  DES  CDC  BB  DES  CDC  BB  DES  CDC  BB
Chile  I/  126  115  297  411  832  696  993  1208
Mexico  2/  983  1966  655  3665
1985  1986  1987  1988
SMP  SMI  SMP  SMI  SMP  SMI  SMP  SMI
Chile  39.2  66.5  62.9  64.1  95.5  58.1  102.5
Mexico  58.0  100.0  53.7  155.0  47.4  75.0
Notation:  BB  debt  buybacks
SMP  average  secondary  market  prices  of sovereign  debt
SMI  average  deflated  level  of stock  market  price  index
Notes:  1/  BB in the  case  of Chile  refers  to Chapter  18  operations  whereby  the
private  sector  officially  repurchased  its  foreign  debt. Only
US$  298  million  correspond  to Central  Bank  BB.
2/  Total  DES  under  the  program  suspended  in  April  1988  was  US$  3.6
billion. Lack  of data  regarding  the  DES  timing  led  us to  prorate
between  June  1986  and  April  1988  the  actual  volume.23
In the  cuse  of Mexico  there  is  also  a positive  correlation  between  the
volume  of DES and the stock  market  price index.  Both grew during  1987  and
dropped  during  1988.  The Mexican  DES program  was interrupted  in  April  1988,
reportedly  due  to its  inflationary  consequences.  However,  other  factors  than
the  ones illustrated  by the model  have probably  been at least  as important.
For  example,  in 1987 structural  reforms  are likely  to have pushed  the  stock
market index upwards.  And high domestic real interest  rates, partly a
consequence  of  a  price stabilization  program, have most likely exerted
downward  pressure  on the  stock  market  during  1988.
On the other hand,  against  model predictions,  secondary  debt prices
de.lined.  Lower debt prices  were, among other reasons,  a consequence  of
higher loan-loss  provisions  and loan charge-offs  by commercial  banks with
heaqy exposure in highly indebted  countries in mid-1987,  higher foreign
interest  rates,  and relatively  poor  economic  growth. In the  case  of Chile  by
late  1987  debt  prices  started  recovering  and  resumed  an upward  trend  continued
through  1989.  In the case  of Mexico,  the  March/April  1988  $  3.6  billion  CDC
exerted  a visible  favorable  impact  on debt prices,  but this  was  not  enough  to
revert  the downward  price trerd.  The distinct  behavior  of debt prices  of
Mexico and Chile  n the long run, though,  is accounted  for by the model
introduced  below.
5.  A DYNAMIC  MODEL  FOR  ASSESSING  DEBT-EQUITY  SWAP  PROGRAMS.
In the model of the previous  sections  asset stocks  were fixed  and
profit  remittances  were determined  exogenously  (i.e.,  not affected  by DES).24
We  now  introduce a  financial model  that incorporates  dynamic equations
describing  the  accumulation  of sovereign  debt  and  equity,  and  where  foreigners
holding  domestic  equity  are allowed  to remit  profits  abroad.  In Subsection
5.1 we describe  the  model and in Subsection  5.2 we derive  conditions  under
which  DES  have  a positive  impact  on the  steady  state  prices  of sovereign  debt
and equity.  In Section 6  we  parametrize  some of those conditions  for
Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile  and  Mexico. There  we conclude  that  DES  are  likely  to
exert  a positive  impact  on debt  prices  in  the  cases  of Brazil  and  Chile,  and  a
negative  impact  in  the  cases  of  Argentina  and  Mexico.
5.1  The  Model.
We suppose  that  there  is  perfect  arbitrage  between  a riskless  foreign
asset,  sovereign  debt and equity  of the  debtor  country.  We assume  perfect
myopic  foresight  of  all prices  and rates  of return. Arbitrage  by the  foreign
sector  ensures  that the return  on sovereign  debt,  the sum  of paid interest,
capitalized  unpaid  interest and  the  correctly  anticipated  change  in  debt
price, matches the foreign  rate of interest r plus a risk premium factor a.
Unlike in the short-term model, profits from foreign equity acquired
through current DES can be remitted abroad.  However, the government imposes
the restriction that only a proportion a  of profits (excluding capital gains)
can be remitted.  Otherwise, profit remittances carry seniority over foreign
debt.  Thus, the trade surplus available to service sovereign debt t is the
difference between the exogenous "trade surplus" t  and profit remittances,
i.e., t =  t  - a*rk*s.  In the long run t  ought to be made endogenous on the
level of output or investment, particularly when there are increasing returns
to scale.  We discuss this issue in Subsection 5.2.25
The arbitrage  condition  between  the riskless  foreign  asset  and debt
is,  hence:
(17)  r + a =  (t*  - a*r,*s)/f*g  +  [r  - (t*  - a*rk*s)/f]  + dg/g
The second  term  on the right  hand side  measures  the increase  in the
sovereign  debt  stock  through  interest  capitalization:
(18)  6f  =  (r  - (t*  - a*rk(s)*S)/f)]*f
We assume  that  the physical  return  on capital  rk is a function  of the
level  of equity:
(19)  rk  =  rk(s)
Arbitrage  ensures  that the  risk-adjusted  return  on equity  matches  the
return on  the riskless foreign asset.  The return on equity has three
components:  actual  profit  remittances  (rk*a);  the  new  asset  created  by profits
which  could  not  be remitted  abroad  (rk*(l  - a));  and  capital  gains  (6q). If c
represents  the risk of holding  equity  vis a vis the  riskless  foreign  asset,
the  other  arbitrage  conditien  is:
(20)  r +  c = a*rk(s)/q  +  (1  - a)*rk(s)  +  6q/q
As  before, tha  second term on the right hand side measures the
increase  in the stock of foreign  held equity  derived  from restrictions  on
profit  remittances  (a).  For simplicity,  we assume that a sets a binding
constraint  on profit reinvestment,  i.e., reinvestment  does not take place
voluntarily.
(21)  s  =  (1  - a)*rk(s)*sf26
5.2.  Steady  State  Effects
Steady  state  debt and equity  prices,  obtained  equating  to zero the
rates  of  change  of  g and  q in (17)  and  (20),  are:
(22)  gss =  ((t  - o*rk(s  )*sf  )/f]/[a  +  (t  - a*rk(s)*s  f )/f]  <  1  since  a
>0
(23)  qss  a  c*rk(s  )/!r  +  c - (1  - o)*rk(s)]
where:  s  is  the  steady  state  level  of the  equity  stock
sf*  is  the  steady  state  level  of the  equity  stock  held  by
foreigners
Or, in  the  particular  case  in  which  a  equals  1:
(24) qSS  =  rk(s*)/(r  +  c)
If, for illustrative  purposes,  we assume  that a  equals  one, equity
carries full  seniority vis  a  vis  sovereign debt or,  in  other words,
remittances  crowd out debt service.3 This ensures  that there is no forced
foreign  equity  accumulation  through  reinvestment  of profits. The absence  of
restrictions  on profit  remittances  is consistent  with the view that  the  main
constraint  on foreign  debt servicing  is a fiscal  constraint,  rather  than a
3.  Actually  this  is  not  true,  particularly  in the  case  of profit  remittances
of equity  acquired  through  DES,  e.g.,  in  Mexico. In the  case  of Chile,  some
foreign  investors  prefer  to  avoid  the  DES  channel  precisely  for  fear  that
discretionary  restrictions  on profit  remittances  could  be  enforced. These
restrictions  are  less  likely  to  be  enforced  on  conventionally  financed  foreign
investment.27
foreign  exchange  constraint. Since  profits  on foreign  held  equity  are  not  a
drain  on fiscal  resources,  if foreign  exchange  is not a binding  constraint,
there is no reason  to expect  restrictions  on profit  remittances,  at least  as
long  as these  do not  become  relatively  sizeable.
A steady  state  requires  that  r equals  (t*  - a*rk(s)*s)/f.  Thus,  the
steady  state  level  of  debt,  f  *, is:
(25)  f* =  r/(t* - a*rk(s*)*sf) k
If  r  exceeds the  (t*  - c*rk(s)*sf  )/f  ratio,  sovereign debt
accumulates  explosively. A steady  state  can  be attained  by raising  the  trade
surplus  t*,  or  by reducing  r,  f or  a*rk(s)*sf  . Since  the  trade  surplus  t* is
the  less  exogenous  of those  facturs,  it is  conventionally  the  one  that  adjusts
to warrant  the  steady  state. However,  with  high  debt and  interest  rates,  and
low  levels of  domestic absorption debtor countries are  facing severe
difficulties  in further  widening  their trade  surpluses. Schemes  of debt or
interest  rate reduction,  or  restrictions  on  profit remittances  (a lower
parameter  a), thus, become  alternatives  for preventing  debt growth  through
capitalization  of unpaid  interest.
What is  the impact  of DES on the steady  state  price  of debt  (gss)  and
equiry (qss) ?
A DES  implemented  at beginning  of period  prices  is  characterized  by:
(26)  ds =  -6f*gr >  0
where:  gr is  the  redemption  price  of foreign  debt28
By  differentiating  gss (see (22))  with respect  to s subject  to (26),
we  find that gss  increases  (drops) if the inequality  (27) is positive
(negative):
(27)  6g5 S/6s1DES  > (<)  0 iff:
(*  - a*rk(s)*sf)/f*gr  - c*(rk  + rkI*s) =
=t  /f*gr  - a*r  *(sf/f*gr  + 1)  - o*r '*sf > (<)  0
where:  (t*  - a*rk(s)*Sf)  > 0
That is,  the  price  of  debt  will increase  (drop)  if f,  gr,  a, rk,  or sf
(assuming  rk/f > - rk')  are relatively  small  (large)  or if t  is relatively
large (small).  It is straightforward  that a  lower stock  of debt will be
associated  with higher  debt prices  in the steady  state (for  given levels  of
all other  factors). On the  other  hand,  a large  t, by increasing  the  capacity
to service  debt,  also raises  the  price  of debt.  A low  gr favors  steady  state
debt  prices  because  (after  the  DES) it increases  the  proportion  of debt  which
can  be serviced. The  favorable  terms  of exchange  (low  gr) implies  that  little
equity  is given in exchange  for  debt,  and implies  that the level  of foreign
transfer  available for debt service (i.e., after servicing  equity) falls
relatively  less  than  debt  drops.
A similar  intuition  applies  in the case of a low rk or a low  a.  In
both  cases,  DES have a beneficial  impact  on debt prices  because  the  level  of
foreign  transfer  available  to service  foreign  debt  drops  relatively  less  than
foreign  debt  (since  profits  or remittances  are small  relative  to  equity).29
Note that  rk' can be negative,  zero or positive  according  to whether
there are  decreasing,  constant or  increasing  returns to  scale.  With
decreasing (increasing)  returns to  scale DES  lower (raise) the average
physical  return on capital,  hence, reducing (raising)  the rate of profit
remittances  and raising  (reducing)  the  price  of debt accordingly. The story
could  be made more realistic  if we endogenize  t  on investment,  e.g.,  t  is
bound to increase  with increasing  returns to scale.  In this case it is
conceivable  that DES may  also raise debt prices since, although profit
remittances  increase,  the foreign transfer  could increase  proportionately
more,  thus,  increasing  the  proportion  of debt  which  can  be serviced.
The technology  reflected  in rk(s)  is even  more crucial  for assessing
the  impact  of  DES  on the  steady  state  equity  price  (qss). Differentiating  qss
(see  (24))  with respect  to s  subject  to the  (26)  constraint,  we find  that  the
DES impact  on qss is negative,  neutral  or positive  depending  on  whether  there
are  decreasing,  constant  or increasing  returns  to scale.
(28'  6qss/6sIDES  rk  '/(r  + c)  < (= or >) 0  iff  rk'  < (= or >)  0
Note, however, that we have not introduced  an equation  describing
total  equity  accumulation  and,  hence,  s  is so  far  determined  exogenously.
Alternatively,  we can  describe  equity  accumulation  by a Tobin  Q-ratio  type  of
investment  function.  In this case, investment  takes  place  whenever  the Q-
ratio,  the  ratio  between  the  market  price  of capital  and its  replacement  cost,
is larger  than  one.  If  we reinterpret  q as the  Tobin-Q  ratio  and  assume  that
only  "foreigners"  invest  in equity,4  equity  investment  is:
4.  It  is  clear  that  even if  only  subsidized  investment  takes  place,
foreigners  are  not  the  only  ones  that  will  invest  in  equity  (through  DES).30
(29)  6s  - Ssf  =  I[q  - 1]
where: I(.)  is  the  equity  investment  function
I(-)  <  0,  I(0)  =  0,  I(+)  >  0,  I'(q  - 1)  >  0
The case in which only foreigners  invest  in equity  can be justified
because  DES-financed  foreign  investment  is subsidized). In some  cases  where
residents  also participate  in DES,  there  is  a deliberate  differential  (lower)
subsidy  to residents,  e.g.,  Chapter  18  operations  in  Chile,  and  the  subsidy  is
usually  close  to the premium  of the parallel  exchange  rate  over  the official
one.
In the steady  state,  when 5s equals  0, q must be one.  Hence, rk
should  equal  (r  +  c) (see  equation  (23)).
In this  case,  unless  we assume  constant  returns  to scale,  rk  constant,
there  is  only  one  possible  steady  state  level  for  the  equity  stock,  i.e.,  that
level of  s  consistent  with q  equal to one.  Thus, with increasing  or
decreasing  returns  DES  may  only induce  transitory  changes  in the  real  stock  of
equity.
To encourage  the foreign  sector  to participate  in a DES governments
typically  offer  a subsidy  o:
(30)  o =  (gr  - g)/g
where:  gr is  the  redemption  price  of  debt  at the  Central  Bank
But  "foreigners"  here  may  be understood  as foreigners  and  residents  holding
sovereign  assets  and  acting  otherwise  as foreigners  (from  an economic  point  of
view).31
With perfect  foresight  the  DES subsidy  immediately  translates  into  a
higher  price  of equity  q.  The higher  equity  price,  in turn,  fosters  equity
investment.  The  government  fixes  the  subsidy  so  as to encourage  enough  equity
investment  to  repurchase  the  desired  amount  of debt. With  constant  returns  to
scale,  once the subsidy  is cut  q drops  back to one  and the  economy  reaches  a
new steady  state  with  a higher  level  of equity.
With decreasing  returns to scale, as equity grows (following  the
subsidy  announcement)  the physical  return  on capital  drops  and, thus,  drives
down the  price of  equity.  Once q  falls below one  it induces equity
disinvestment,  e.g.,  via  depreciation,  up to the  point  where  the  equity  stock
returns  to its initial  level  and the  price  of equity  becomes  one again.  At
the new equilibrium  the share  of foreigners  in domestic  equity  is likely  to
increase.
6. Some  Applications  to  Latin  America.
To illustrate  the model result  about the DES impact  on the steady
state price of  debt we  parametrize  inequality  (27) employing data from
Argentina,  Brazil, Chile and Mexico.  According  to the model, a  positive
(negative)  sign of  the inequality  implies  that  DES raise  (lower)  the steady
state  price  of sovereign  debt.  Table  3 provides  the parameter  values  and the
estimated  value  of inequality  (27)  for  each  country.
To approximate  the  parameter  t */f we employ  the  average  trade  surplus-
debt ratio  of 1986-87.  The parameter  sf/f is measured  by the ratio  of the
stock  of foreign  investment  to total  foreign  debt for  the  last  year  for  which
foreign investment  stock figures were available.  The  parameter gr  is32
approximated  by the average redemption  price less central bank fees; it
corresponds  to the 1988  average  price  of DES  for  each  country. The  parameter
a  is approximated  by the difference  between  one  and the percentage  of years
over  which  profit  remittances  were prohibited  (under  the last or current  DES
program)  in the  last  ten  years.  For  all  countries  we assume  constant  returns
to scale,  i.e.,  rk'  equal  to zero,  and  a real  rate  of return  on capital  of 6.8
percent.  The 6.8  percent rate was obtained subtracting  the US rate of
inflation from the nominal average rate of return of US  foreign direct
investments  for all Latin  America  in the year 1985  (see  footnote  4 of Table
3).  The  evidence  reported in Table 3  indicates  that DES  will raise
secondary  market  prices  in the  cases  of Brazil  and  Chile,  and reduce  them in
the  cases  of Mexico  and  Argentina. Note,  however,  that  the  price  impacts  are
very  small  and  are  sensitive  to the  assumptions  made.
Table 3. Steady State Impact of DES on Sovereign Debt Prices l/.
Estimated  Parameter Values (Z)  Price Impact
t  /f  v  2/  a  s/f  3/  r  4/  S t*/f  &2/  -k  A
Argentina  3.2  57  75  20  6.8  - 0.015
Brazil  8.2  68  100  24  6.8  0.025
Chile  5.6  86  75  11  6.8  0.006
Mexico  6.2  87  .00  16  6.8  - 0.012
Note:  1/  Based  on inequality  (27)
2/  Estimates  were  obtained  from  Larrain  (1989),  Sanguines  (1989),
and  Rodriguez  (1989).
3/ The sources for the stock of foreign  direct investment  are "IRM
Directory  of Statistics  of International  Investment  and  Production",
Macmillan 1987;  and 'Foreign Direct Investment in Selected Developing
Countries in the Last Two Decades",  Gyorgy Becsky, World Bank, draft33
It corresponds  to  the  year  1984  for  Chile  and  Mexico,  1983  for
Argentina  and 1985  for  Brazil.
4/ Is based  on the  1985  average  rate  of return  on all  US foreign
investment  in  Latin  America,  which  was  10 percent,  after  subtracting
the  US inflation  rate . The source  is:  "Transational  Corporations  in
World  Development",  New  York,  1988,  United  Nations  Centre  on
Transational  Corporations.
Large trade surpluses  (as a proportion  of debt) in Brazil  and low
trade surpluses  in Argentina are crucial for explaining  the differential
effect  of DES on debt prices  in the case of these  countries  (Table  3).  The
larger  the  trade  surplus-debt  ratio  the  more  debt reduction  raises  the  actual
debt service-debt  ratio  and, therefore,  the  more debt prices  rise.  On the
other  hand,  restrictions  on profit  remittances  under  the  DES  regime,  and lower
levels  of foreign  held  equity  in Chile,  compared  with Mexico,  may explain  the
favorable  effect  of DES  on debt prices  in the  former  country  and  the  negative
effect  in  the  latter.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The  main findings  of this  paper  can  be summarized  as follows:
i)  The  widespread  view  that  money-financed  DES  feed  inflation  was
modelled  in a short-term  portfolio  balance  framework. Casual
inspection  of DES  and inflation  data  of Argentina,  Brazil  and
Mexico  support  this  view.
ii)  The short  term  end  of period  portfolio  model  also  predicts
that debt-equity  swaps  and debt conversions  raise sovereign
debt prices.  This is due to old debt reduction  and, in the
case of  debt-equity  swaps, to short term restrictions  on
profit  remittances  (short-term restrictions on  profit34
remittances  imply that the proportion  of old debt actually
serviced  increases  after the  swap). Casual  inspection  of the
evidence suggests that in the cases of Mexico and Chile
voluntary  debt reduction schemes have exerted a  favorable
impact  on debt prices. However,  the impact  of other  factors
such as bink provisions  against  loan losses  and chargeoffs,
has  probably  been  at least  as important.
iii)  In the  short  term  portfolio  bala..ce  framework,  we also  show
that debt reduction  schemes  push equity  prices  upwards.  in
the case of debt-equity  swaps,  this is due to the subsidy,
given  by  the  difference between redemption prices and
secondary  market  prices,  to foreign  investors  which  creates  an
excess  demand  for equity.  In the case of debt conversions,
the  excess  demand  for  equity  stems  from  portfolio  substitution
induced  by the  drop in the  actual  debt service-old  debt  ratio
of old debt.  Both in Mexico  and Chile  the  pro.ty  for  equity
prices, a  stock market price index, exhibits a  positive
correlation  with the volume  of debt-equity  swaps.  However,
factors  such as structural  reforms  in Chile and Mexico,  and
the 1988 stabilization  plan  in Mexico,  have probably  been at
least  as important  determinants  of stock  market  prices.
iv)  Finally,  we formulate  a long-term  dynamic  model,  where  profit
remittances  on foreign  held equity  acquired  through  DES are
endogenous.  We show  that  debt-equity  swaps  are  more  likely  to
raise (lower) the steady state price of debt the larger
(smaller) the levels: of  the exogenous trade surplus,  of35
restrictions  on profit remittances,  and  of the redemption
price  of debt,  and  the  smaller  (larger)  the  levels  of  debt  and
of the  physical  return  on capital.
v)  A parametrization  of the  conditions  under  which  debt-equity
swaps raise secondary  market prices, indicates that debt-
equity swaps are more likely  to improve  steady state debt
prices  in the  cases  of Brasil  and  Chile,  than in the  cases  of
Argentina  and  Mexico.  0
vi)  In  the  long  term  model  technology  also  matters:  we  show  that
the  positive  impact  of  debt-equity  swaps  on debt  prices  may  be
reduced  when there are increasing  returns to scale, since
higher  profits  and profit  remittances  lower the part of the
trade  surplus  available  to service  debt (hence  reducing  its
steady  state  price).  On the other  hand, increasing  returns
could  also  raise  the  trade  surplus  (here  treated as
exogenous),  thus,  neutralizing  that  effect.
vii)  An  important  feature  of  the  model  is  that  without  constant
returns  to scale  debt-equity  swaps  can only induce  transitory
increases  in the steady  state  stock  of equity.  The type of
technology  is also important  for assessing  the steady  state
impact  of  debt-equity  swaps  on equity  prices.
viii)  One  crucial  limitation  of our  long  term  analysis  is  the
exogeneity  of the trade surplus,  particularly  when there  are
increasing returns to  scale.  Some  of  the  long  term
comparative  static  multipliers  could  be reversed  in sign (see
vi).36
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